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NOTES 

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DEVELOPING GUIDELINES IN 
FOURTH AMENDMENT "CLOTHING CASES" AFTER UNITED STATES 
V. BUTLER 
INTRODucnON 
In Katz v. United States,l the United States Supreme Court 
held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions."2 These "few" excep­
tions, however, have since mushroomed into a litany of exceptions 
so numerous that many commentators conclude that the warrant 
requirement itself has become the exception to the rule.3 
Perhaps this expansion is inevitable, given the tension between 
the amorphous "reasonableness" standard that serves as the touch­
stone to Fourth Amendment inquiries and the infinite variety of 
factual scenarios that the amendment seeks to govern. As Profes­
sor LaFave has noted, "the art/science of police rulemaking is be­
deviled by a collision of those antithetical dynamics which pervade 
our entire legal system; . . . we are confronted with the 'conflict 
1. 389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
2. Id. at 357 (footnote omitted). 
3. See, e.g., Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-First 
Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 588 (1990) (arguing that "[t]he formerly proclaimed judicial 
preference for a warrant is virtually non-existent"); Frank C. Capozza, Note, Whither 
the Fourth Amendment: An Analysis of Illinois v. Rodriguez, 25 IND. L. REV. 515, 546 
(1991) (claiming that "Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has created more exceptions 
to the warrant requirement than there are words in the amendment itself'); Phyllis T. 
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 
44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 501 (1991) (regarding the Katz Court's assertion that only a few 
well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement exist: "Perhaps no more fre­
quently quoted statement is less true. The narrow exceptions doctrine ... has given 
way to an extensive list of exceptions."); Catherine T. Clarke, Criminal Law and Proce­
dure, 36 Loy. L. REV. 753, 756 n.20 (1990) ('''[T]he fact of the matter is that a great 
majority of police seizures and searches are made and upheld notwithstanding the ab­
sence of a warrant."') (quoting Y. KAMISAR ET AL., BASIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 207 
(7th ed. 1990) (citations omitted». 
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between the simplicity of rules and the complexity of human 
experience.' "4 
Such "conflict" and "complexity" is apparent in the situation in 
which police, pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, arrive at a defend­
ant's home and proceed to place the defendant under arrest. The 
arrestee surely will be taken to the police station for booking. But 
what if at the time of the arrest the arrestee is not fully clothed, is 
not wearing shoes, or perhaps is wearing an inadequate amount of 
clothing to confront the weather conditions outside of his or her 
home? Before the arrestee is transported to the police station, may 
the police, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, enterS the arres­
tee's residence to obtain additional clothing for him or her? 
In an effort to answer this question, this Note will focus on 
United States v. Butler,6 a case from the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit in which police, without a search warrant, consent 
from the defendant, or exigent circumstances, entered the defend­
ant's residence to obtain his shoes for the sole purpose of protecting 
his "health and safety."7 
Numerous courts have confronted this issue,8 but only in a tan­
gential and secondary manner. In Butler, by contrast, the majority 
opinion revolved solely around this issue. Furthermore, unlike pre­
vious "clothing cases," Butler possessed the factually-unique combi­
nation of a real danger to the arrestee and a lack of opportunity for 
the arrestee to consent to police entry of his residence. Like these 
4. Wayne R. LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The 
Use, Misuse, and Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudica­
tion, 89 MICH. L. REV. 442, 517-18 (1990) (quoting Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of 
Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 1, 3 (1984». 
5. If the arrest was effectuated inside the defendant's residence, the question be­
comes: may the police make a further entry into his or her home? 
6. 980 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1992). 
7. Id. at 622. 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1016 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 465 U.s. 1100 (1984); United States v. Kinney, 638 F.2d 941, 943 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981); United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094, 1097 (2d 
Cir. 1977); United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Giacalone v. 
Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972); United 
States v. Titus, 445 F.2d 577, 578-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971); State v. 
Risinger, 762 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Ark. 1989); State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 334 (N.J. 
1983); State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1983); State v. Richards, 242 S.E.2d 
844, 852 (N.C. 1978); Clark v. State, 548 S.W.2d 888, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); 
Walker v. United States, 318 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C. 1974); People v. Green, 304 N.E.2d 
32,40 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 972 (1974); Moffett v. State, 281 So.2d 
630 (Ala. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974). 
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other "clothing cases," however, the Butler opinion left several es­
sential questions unresolved. First, accepting for argument's sake 
that the police acted reasonably in entering Butler's residence,9 
they could have taken alternative steps to minimize the invasion of 
privacy that the entry entailed. The question is, should they have 
been required to take such steps? Secondly, under what circum­
stances, if any, are such alternative measures required? This Note 
will analyze and critique the Butler holding in an attempt to provide 
an answer to these questions. 
Section I provides a brief overview of the Fourth Amend­
ment's warrant requirement and the numerous exceptions that the 
Supreme Court has recognized. Section II frames the issue raised 
by Butler and the two distinct factual situations that arise in similar 
cases: (1) those in which the defendant requests additional clothing; 
and (2) those in which police are the motivating force behind the 
request. Section III examines the facts and reasoning of the Butler 
opinion, noting in particular the incongruity between the majority 
and the dissenting opinion regarding the amount of danger Butler 
faced because of the condition of his yard. Section IV assesses the 
validity of the Butler majority's "health and safety" argument by 
examining its factual and precedential rooting. This section identi­
fies the key factors utilized by other courts in addressing the issue 
and applies those factors to Butler. Section V analyzes the compet­
ing police and arrestee interests inherent in all "clothing cases" and 
argues for the implementation of a "least intrusive alternative" re­
quirement. A three-pronged procedure for implementing this pro­
posed requirement is also outlined in this section. Finally, this Note 
concludes that although the Butler majority may have been mis­
taken in allowing a police officer's belief in the need to protect the 
arrestee's health and safety to outweigh the arrestee's legitimate 
privacy expectations, the opinion nonetheless provides a useful ana­
lytical foundation from which standards for future "clothing cases" 
can be developed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Warrant Requirement and Its Exceptions 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right to be protected against "unreasonable searches 
9. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623; see infra note 131, which discusses the factual dispute 
over the amount of danger that the glass and detritus in Butler's yard actually posed to 
him. 
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and seizures" by mandating that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause."10 The language of the amendment indicates that 
citizens will not be shielded from all governmental searches and 
seizures; rather, only from· those which are deemed 
"unreasonable."11 
The ever-expanding list of exceptions to the warrant require­
ment12 currently includes, but is not limited to, automobile 
searches,B searches performed incident to arrests,14 plain view 
seizures,ls searches occurring under the broad rubric of "exigent 
circumstances,"16 and consensual searchesP The pertinent excep­
tions raised by Butler are consent, exigent circumstances, and 
searches incident to arrests. Consequently, each of these categories 
merits analysis. 
1. Consent 
For Fourth Amendment purposes, consent, whether express or 
implied, is the agreement by an individual that police may conduct 
an otherwise forbidden search or seizure.1s In Schneckloth v. Bus­
tamonte,19 the United States Supreme Court laid the foundation for 
what has become a frequently invoked exception to the warrant re­
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef­

fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma­
tion, and particularly· describing the place to be searched, and the person or 
things to be seized. 
Id. 
11. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990) ("It goes without saying 
that the Fourth Amendment bars only unreasonable searches and seizures."). 
12. Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 
1468 (1985). Professor Bradley tallied a total of twenty-two exceptions as of 1985. Id. 
at 1473-74 . 
• 13. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless search of auto­
mobile upheld in order to preserve evidence, as car could be driven out of jurisdiction 
before officers could obtain warrant). 
14. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (in order to protect the police 
and prevent destruction of evidence, police may search the area within the defendant's 
immediate control after a lawful arrest). 
15. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (police may seize evi­
dence in plain view from place where they are lawfully entitled to be)., 
16. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit is an exigent circum­
stance justifying entry of dwelling without warrant when police have probable cause to 
believe evidence may be lost or destroyed). 
17. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218(1973). 
18. Id. at 243. 
19. Id. at 218. 
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quirement.2o Under Schneckloth, the state bears the burden of 
demonstrating that the defendant's consent to the search was in fact 
voluntary.21 However, the state is not required to demonstrate that 
the defendant had knowledge of the right to refuse the search.22 
The rationale at work in Schneckloth, and behind consent searches 
in general, is clear: "In situations where the police have some evi­
dence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a 
search authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of ob­
taining important and reliable evidence."23 Thus, it is not "unrea­
sonable" under the Fourth Amendment for the police to conduct a 
search or seizure when the defendant has voluntarily agreed to it, 
even though the defendant may not have known that he or she 
could have refused to grant consent. 
Critics, however, charge that the minimal burden on the prose­
cution in demonstrating the voluntariness of a "consensual" search 
combined with the broad power police possess once given consent 
results in great unfairness to defendants.24 Despite such objections, 
the Supreme Court, and in its wake, state and federal courts, have 
continued to employ25 and even expand26 the parameters of the 
consent exception. 
2. Exigent Circumstances 
The "exigent circumstances" exception to the warrant require­
20. See, e.g., United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 559-60 (1980); Uni,ted 
States v. Lechuga, 925 F.2d 1035, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Diaz, 814 
F.2d 454, 458-59 (7th Cir. 1987). 
21. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 (voluntariness "is a question of fact to be deter­
mined from the totality of all the circumstances."); see also Bumper v. North Carolina, 
391 U.S. 543, 548-50 (1968). 
22. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. 
23. Id. 
24. See Joseph G. Casaccio, Note, Illegally Acquired Information, Consent 
Searches, and Tainted Fruit, 87 COLUM. .L. REV. 842, 850-51 (1987); Daniel L. Roten­
berg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175,175-76 (1991). 
25. This exception is often employed in spite of what would appear to be ques­
tionable circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 24-25 (1st 
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2813 (1991) (consent to search deemed voluntary even 
though officers entered homes with guns drawn, 'handcuffed and frisked defendant, and 
. threatened to "tear the place apart" unless he told them more, because defendant gave 
specific consent to search duffel bag and told officer location and contents of bag). 
Similarly, see infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text, discussing the broadly con­
strued "consent" obtained by police officers in Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238 (6th 
Cir. 1971). 
26. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (warrantless entry is valid 
when based upon consent of third party who police, at time of entry, reasonably but 
mistakenly believe to possess common authority over premises). 
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ment covers innumerable situations in which the need for immedi­
ate action on the 'part of law enforcement officers justifies a 
warrantless entry into a private dwelling.27 ,There is no precise 
formula which can be used to determine whether exigent circum­
stances exist. Instead, the particular facts of each situation must be 
analyzed. Exigent circumstances, however, can be broken down 
into the following three primary categories:28 (1) "hot pursuit" of a 
fleeing suspect;29 (2) prevention of the imminent destruction of 
nevidence;3o and (3) an "emergency" which threatens the life of an­
other.31 These three categories merely illustrate the most common 
scenarios deemed to qualify as exigent circumstances and in no way 
amount to an exhaustive compilation.32 
Because of the wide variety of situations that can give rise to 
exigent circumstances, the goal of having exceptions to the warrant 
requirement "jealously and carefully drawn"33 can result in an un­
easy tension. Balancing an individual's Fourth Amendment protec­
tion against the legitimate state interest in permitting police to 
actively respond to situations in which obtaining a warrant would 
be impractica}34 can become a painstakingly fact-specific task. 
Although the exigent circumstances exception encompasses 
countless factual situations, it is subject to specific limitations. Po­
lice cannot manufacture an exigency35 nor engage in any form of 
27. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385,391 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en 
bane) (essential question in determining whether exigent circumstances justified war­
rantless entry is whether law enforcement agents were confronted by urgent need to 
render aid or take action), 
28. See H. Patrick Furman, The. Exigent Circumstances Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement, 20 COLO. LAW. 1167, 1168 (1991). 
29. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1989). 
30. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 967 F.2d 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1992) 
("Reasonable fear of the destruction or removal of evidence is an exigent circumstance 
that may justify a warrantless entry into a private home."). 
31. See, e.g., Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971). 
32. As Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger noted in a frequently-quoted opinion, 
"[a] myriad of circumstances could fall within the terms 'exigent circumstances.'" 2 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
§ 6,6(a), at 697-98 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 
(D.C. Cir. 1963». 
33. See, e.g" United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 1986); United 
States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1270 (1988); United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 
1567 (10th Cir. 1992). See also discussion of Butler dissent infra, notes 129, 145 and 
accompanying text. 
34. See Edward G. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant 
Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L. REV, 419,428 (1973) (discuss­
ing the "exceedingly useful purpose" provided by the emergency doctrine). 
35. See United States v. Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 878 (D,C. Cir. 1991) (citing 
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deception in an attempt to circumvent the warrant requirement.36 
In addition, the burden of proving the existence of an exigent cir­
cumstance rests on the state.37 
3. Search Incident to Arrest 
Chimel v. California38 provides the fountainhead of authority 
for the proposition that upon arrest, without additional justification, 
police may search the person and effects of an arrestee and the area 
within the arrestee's "immediate control": the area from which the 
arrestee might obtain a weapon or destructible evidence.39 After 
Chimel, the scope of the search incident to arrest was expanded in 
Maryland v. Buie4° to allow "protective sweeps" when an arrest oc­
curs in a home. Such a sweep is justified only when "the searching 
officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articul­
able facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a 
danger to those on the arrest scene. "41 
II. BUTLER AND THE TYPICAL "CLOTHING CASE" SCENARIO 
May police, without a warrant, consent of the arrestee, or exi­
gent circumstances, conduct a limited entry into a residence for the 
sole purpose of protecting the health and safety of an arrestee? If 
this question is answered affirmatively, subsequent inquiry must ex­
plore the circumstances and limitations, if any, governing such an 
entry. The factual context in which this narrow Fourth Amendment 
issue arises can vary slightly from case to case, but the underlying 
issue remains static. Police officers often arrive at the defendant's 
residence42 with a valid arrest warrant. Sometimes, as in United 
States v. Di Stefano,43 Giacalone v. Lucas,44 and Walker v. United 
United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 858 
(1988)) (officers may not create emergency and then use it to justify an emergency 
search). 
36. See United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1253 (3d Cir. 1992) ("The words 
'trickery' and 'subterfuge' are employed in Fourth Amendment context to invalidate 
police conduct in situations where officers accomplish their objective through deceptive 
strategy."). 
37. See, e.g., United States v. Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 267 (9th Cir. 1984). 
38. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
39. [d. at 762-63. 
40. 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
41. [d. at 325. 
42. Other "clothing case" arrests have taken place in the hallway outside of the 
defendant's hotel room. See United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982). 
43. 555 F.2d 1094, 1097 (2d Cir. 1977) (9:00 a.m.). 
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States,45 the police arrive at an early morning hour. After knocking 
at the door and announcing the purpose of their visit, they are al­
lowed into the dwelling.46 
More frequently, however, the scenario mirrors the pattern 
seen in Butler,47 United States v. Kinney,48 and United States v. 
Anthon,49 where the defendant is placed under arrest outside or at 
the entrance of his dwelling. At this point, the circumstances may 
allow the defendant to move about the premises before departing 
to the police station. "Although this may occur for other reasons as 
well, it occurs with [the] greatest frequency when the defendant 
needs to change his clothes or put on additional clothing before 
departing. "50 
After the defendant is placed under arrest, case law reveals 
that two distinct factual situations can then arise. Either the de­
fendant will ask to be allowed to obtain clothing,51 or, less fre­
quently, the police will be the "motivating force" behind the 
request.52 Butler is a prime example of the latter situation.53 "In 
either event, the courts have had little hesitancy . . . [admitting] 
evidence discovered by the police as a consequence."54 
Washington v. Chrisman,55 a United States Supreme Court case 
that formed the basis of the Butler majority'S analysis,56 allows the 
arresting officer to remain at the arrestee's side and follow him 
44. 445 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972) (6:00 
a.m.). 
45. 318 A.2d 290, 290-91 (D.C. 1974) (6:00 a.m.). 
46. Officers are often given permission to enter a residence from a third party 
(i.e., someone other than the defendant). See id. at 291 (officers admitted by defend­
ant's mother); State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 334 (N.J. 1983) (officers admitted by 
defendant's aunt). 
47. United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 619, 620 (10th Cir. 1992). 
48. 638 F.2d 941, 943 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981). 
·49. 648 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982). 
50. LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.4(a), at 636. See infra notes 51-52 for a listing of 
these "clothing cases." 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1015 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); 
State v. Risinger, 762 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Ark. 1989); State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 521 
(Minn. 1983); State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 323 (N.J. 1983). 
52. See, e.g., Kinney, 638 F.2d 941, 943 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981); 
Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 
(1972); Walker v. United States, 318 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C. 1974). 
53. United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 619, 620 (10th Cir. 1992). 
54. LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6.4(a), at 636. 
55. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982). 
56. See infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text for the Butler majority's discus­
sion of Chrisman. 
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wherever he goes.57 In Chrisman, the Court held that it is not un­
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as his 
judgment dictates, to routinely monitor the movements of an ar­
rested person following the arrest. "The officer's need to ensure his 
own safety-as well as the integrity of the arrest-is compelling. 
Such surveillance is not an impermissible invasion of the privacy or 
personal liberty of an individual who has been arrested. "58 
Upon entering the residence, the officer then accompanies the 
arrestee to another part of the dwelling. In Butler,59 Giacalone,60 
Bruzzese,61 and Walker,62 the arrestees, not surprisingly, went or 
were transported by the officers to their bedrooms to obtain shoes 
or additional clothing.63 Finally, once an officer enters a bedroom, 
a search incident to the arrest, or, more frequently, a plain view 
observation may reveal the presence of evidence that is subse­
quently used to convict the defendant. An example of the search 
incident to arrest situation occurred in Giacalone, where a search of 
the arrestee's room unearthed a cache of weapons inside a chest.64 
Examples of the latter doctrine took place in Butler65 and United 
States v. Titus.66 Assuming the officer was lawfully entitled to be 
present in the area where he or she discovered the evidence in 
question, it may be seized.67 This assumption, of course, is precisely 
what was at issue in Butler. 
57. Chrisman, however, is not a "clothing case." The arrestee here sought to ob­
tain his identification by returning to his dormitory room. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 3. 
58. [d. at 7. 
59. United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 619, 620 (10th Cir. 1992). 
60. Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1247 (6th Cir. 1971), cerr. denied, 405 U.S. 
922 (1972). 
61. State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 334 (N.J. 1983). 
62. Walker v. United States, 318 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C. 1974). 
63. Butler, 980 F.2d at 620; Giacalone, 445 F.2d at 1247; Bruzzese, 463 A.2d at 
334-45; Walker, 318 A.2d at 291. 
64. Giacalone, 445 F.2d at 1245-46. The court in Giacalone predicated justifica­
tion of the search of the chest on first obtaining the consent of the arrestee: 
Certainly, if immediately after a lawful arrest, the arrestee reads the arrest 
warrant and without coercion consents to go to his bedroom to change into 
more appropriate clothing, the arresting officers-incident to that arrest-may 
search the areas upon which the arrestee focuses his attention and are within 
his reach to gain access to a weapon or to destroy evidence. 
[d. at 1247. 
65. Butler, 980 F.2d at 620 (shotgun and two .22 caliber rifles seen in plain view). 
66. United States v. Titus, 445 F.2d 577, 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 
(1971) (noting that "a considerable quantity of money" was seen on floor of bank rob­
bery suspect's apartment). 
67. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 444 (1971). 
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III. UNITED STATES V. BUTLEJE>8 
A. Facts 
On April 30, 1991, two deputy United States marshals and two 
county sheriff's officers arrived at Billy Deon Butler's rural trailer­
home residence near Nashoba, Oklahoma, to serve a warrant for 
his arrest.69 The grounds of Butler's property were strewn with lit­
ter, including broken glass, several hundred beer cans, and various 
motor vehicle parts.1° 
Willis Bruce, who lived in the trailer with Butler, met the of­
ficers outside the trailer.71 Marshal Carroll Allberry told Bruce 
that they had a warrant for Butler's arrest, and asked him if he 
knew where Butler was.72 Bruce indicated that Butler was inside 
the trailer. Butler then appeared and Allberry told him to come 
outside, where the officers placed him under arrest.73 
While he handcuffed Butler, Allberry saw that Butler was not 
wearing shoes, and noticed broken glass on the ground near But­
ler's feet,74 The debris on the ground would have prevented the 
officers from escorting Butler to their vehicles safely.7s Allberry 
thus asked Butler if he had any shoes, to which Butler replied that 
he did, but that they were inside the trailer.16 Bruce asked his girl­
friend, who was also present, if she would go inside to get Butler's 
shoes, at which time Allberry told Butler, "[w]ell, let's go on in and 
get them. "77 
68. 980 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1992). 
69. Id. at 620. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. The level of danger posed to defendant Butler by the debris on the 
ground is a crucial factual question on which the majority and the dissent sharply disa­
gree. Judge Seymour, in dissent, observed that "the evidence is undisputed that Mr. 
Butler and his companions, who were also barefooted, had just walked back and forth 
across the yard without injury to go to the river to bathe." Id. at 623. This evidence was 
conspicuously absent in the majority opinion. See infra note 131 and accompanying 
text. 
76. Butler, 980 F.2d at 620. 
77. Id. Unlike the majority, Judge Seymour noted that "Mr. Butler did not ex­
press concern about the possibility of injury to his bare feet and did not request the 
opportunity to put on his shoes." Id. at 623. Seymour's account of the exchange be­
tween the officer and Butler differed slightly from the majority's account. Seymour, 
citing volume II of the (unpublished) district court record at page 14 (the only explicit 
citation to the record in the opinion), records the officer's statement as: "'Let's go 
inside' ... 'to get your shoes'." Id. at 624. Seymour also noted that "[t]he district court 
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AUberry escorted Butler inside the trailer, where Butler led 
him into a bedroom.78 AUberry noticed two apparently inoperable 
.22 caliber rifles inside the trailer, one at the entrance, and another 
in a gun rack in Butler's bedroom.79 AUberry also noticed a shot­
gun lying next to Butler's bed.so The shotgun was seized and found 
to be loaded.81 
Butler was indicted in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Oklahoma on August 7,199182 and charged with 
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 922(g)(1).83 Prior 
to trial, he moved to suppress the firearm, but the motion was de­
nied on September 10, 1991.84 On October 15, 1991, the jury re­
turned a verdict of guilty.85 Butler was subsequently sentenced to a 
twenty-one month prison term, with three years supervision upon 
his release.86 
B. 	 Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit 
1. 	 Majority Opinion 
The majority of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of Butler's motion to 
suppress. The court rejected the defendant's contention that the 
seizure of the firearm violated his rights under the Fourth Amend-
in the present case found neither a request by Mr. Butler that the officer take him into 
his house, or his consent." Id. at 623. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
78. 	 Butler, 980 F.2d at 620. 
79. 	 Id. 
80. 	 Id. 
81. 	 Id. at 621. 
82. 	 Id. at 620. 
83. 18 U.S.c. § 922(g)(1) (1988) states: 

It shall be unlawful for any person ­
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by impris­
onment for a term exceeding one year; 
... , 
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affect­
ing commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammu­
nition that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 
Id. 
84. Butler, 980 F.2d at 620. "In denying Butler's motion to suppress, the district 
court noted in particular the decision of the Supreme Court in Washington v. Chrisman, 
455 U.S. 1 (1982)." Id. at 621. See infra notes 88-95,134-36 and accompanying text for 
analysis of Chrisman. 
85. 	 980 F.2d at 620. 
86. 	 Id. 
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ment.87 Judge Patrick F. Kelly, writing for the majority, began the 
court's opinion by examining Washington v. Chrisman,88 the foun­
dation for the district court's denial of Butler's motion to 
suppress.89 
In Chrisman, a campus police officer stopped Overdahl, an ap­
parently underage university student, outside of his dorm room be­
cause he was carrying a bottle of gin.90 The officer asked to see 
identification. Overdahl responded that his identification was in­
side his room, and asked to retrieve it.91 The officer accompanied 
Overdahl to his room, then stood in the open doorway while moni­
toring Overdahl's actions inside the dorm room.92 Approximately 
thirty to forty-five seconds after Overdahl entered the room, the 
officer noticed marijuana seeds and a pipe lying on a desk.93 In the 
subsequent prosecution of Overdahl's roommate, Chrisman, for il­
legal possession of narcotics, the Supreme Court held that seizure 
of the drugs and paraphernalia was justified.94 The Court explained 
that the officer was authorized to accompany Overdahl to his room 
and the evidence of the narcotics was in plain view.95 In Butler, 
the defendant argued that Chrisman was distinguishable, because in 
that case it was the defendant who invited the officer into the resi­
dence, whereas in Butler's case, the police officer initiated the entry 
by telling him to go inside and put on some shoes.96 The court was 
not persuaded by this distinction. Noting that the evidence of bro­
ken glass on the ground was "uncontradicted," the majority was sat­
isfied from reviewing the district court record that the police entry 
was not made in "bad faith."97 
87. Id. 
88. 455 u.S. 1 (1982). 
89. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621. 
90. Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 3. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 4. 
94. Id. at 7. 
95. Id. 
96. United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 619, 621 (10th Cir. 1992). Although it is not 
mentioned in either the majority or dissenting opinions, Butler's appellate argument 
misconstrued the facts of Chrisman: it was Overdahl, not Chrisman, who invited the 
officer into the dorm room. See Chrisman, 455 U.S. at 3. However, this error is irrele­
vant to both the reasoning and holding of Butler since the pertinent fact of Chrisman 
remains the same: it was the student who invited the officer to accompany him as he 
returned to his room. Compare infra note 133 and accompanying text regarding Judge 
Seymour's emphasis on consent. 
97. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621. The majority noted that "the district court explicitly 
found that there was no evidence that the concern for Butler's welfare, as manifested by 
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The court then set out the heart of its argument by citing and 
analogizing to three cases in which police, without an express invi­
tation as in Chrisman, were allowed to conduct a limited entry into 
an area "for the purpose of protecting the health or safety of an 
arrestee."98 
In United States v. Titus, the first of these cases, the defendant 
was naked when FBI agents arrested him in his home.99 While ob­
taining clothes for the defendant, the agents discovered evidence 
connecting him with a recent bank robbery.lOo On appeal, this evi­
dence was upheld as admissible since it was in plain view during the 
search for the defendant's clothes.lol The court in Butler rioted that 
"[t]he search for clothing was proper ... since the agents 'were 
bound to find some clothing for Titus rather than take him nude to 
FBI headquarters on a December night."'lo2 
The second case the majority relied on for support of this point 
was United States v. Di Stefano.103 According to the Butler major­
ity, the defendant in Di Stefano "was arrested outside [of] her house 
... wearing only a nightgown and bathrobe."l04 The police re­
quested that she get dressed, and then, while she was dressing, no­
ticed evidence connecting her to a bank robbery.105 Relying on 
Titus, the Di Stefano court upheld the seizure of this evidence stat­
ing that "[t]he officers had a duty to find clothing for ... [the de­
fendant] to wear or to permit her to do SO."106 
Lastly, the majority briefly invoked United States v. Brown107 
as an "exception" to the general rule that an arrest outside of a 
residence does not authorize warrantless entry "'when an officer 
accompanies the arrestee into a residence or room in order to allow 
the police instruction for him to put on some shoes, was a pretext by which the police 
sought to enter the mobile home." Id. For a good background discussion on pretextual 
arrests, see Robert D. Snook, Note, Pretextual Arrests and Alternatives to the Objective 
Test, 12 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 105 (1990). 
98. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621. 
99. United States v. Titus, 445 F.2d 577, 578 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 
(1971). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 579. 
102. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621 (quoting Titus, 445 F.2d at 579). 
103. 555 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1977). 
104. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621. The Butler majority's description of the facts in Vi 
Stefano is inaccurate, since the facts of that case clearly indicate that officers knocked 
on the door of Di Stefano's house and were admitted. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d at 1097. 
After the officers were aamitted, they placed the defendant under arrest. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 1101. 
107. 951 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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the arrestee to obtain clothing or identification.'''lo8 In Brown, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that two police officers' 
connection with a corruption investigation unit did not establish 
probable cause for a search of their home.109 Despite the lack of 
probable cause, the court upheld the resulting search of the officers' 
home based on the searching agents' good faith belief in the validity 
of the warrant.110 
The court in Butler noted that the "health and safety" argu­
ment it was promulgating was not an unlimited grant of power to 
the police.111 Citing United States v. Anthon,112 the court reiterated 
that without consent or exigent circumstances, police may not make 
a warrantless entry into the ddendant's residence solely upon their 
desire "to complete the arrestee's wardrobe."113 In Anthon, the de­
fendant was arrested in a hotel hallway, clad only in a swim suit.114 
He was taken to his room (where he was allowed to change into 
some clothes) and questioned for thirty-forty minutes.us During 
the questioning, officers discovered a vial of cocaine and a mari­
juana cigarette.u6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit held that the seizure of the narcotics violated the Fourth 
Amendment and thus suppressed the evidence.117 There was no ev­
idence that the defendant asked to retrieve his clothes or had con­
sented to the police entry into his room; neither were there any 
exigent circumstances which would have justified a warrantless en­
try.118 
The Butler majority held that the facts of Butler were distin­
guishable from Anthon, however, because of the non-pretextual 
"presence of a legitimate and significant threat to the health and 
108. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621 (quoting Brown, 951 F.2d at 1(05). But see infra note 
142, which notes dissenting Judge Seymour's observation that the facts of Brown make 
the case inapposite to the "exception" the majority invoked. 
109. Brown, 951 F.2d at 1000·03. 
110. [d. at 1003-07. 
111. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621. "This in no way creates a blank check for intrusion 
upon the privacy of the sloppily dressed." [d. 
112. 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982). Although 
Anthon was a Tenth Circuit case, Judge Seymour was the only Butler judge who had 
participated in that decision. 
113. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621-22. 
114. Anthon, 648 F.2d at 672. 
115. [d. at 672, 674. 
116. [d. at 672, 675. 
117. [d. at 675. 
118. [d. 
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safety of the arrestee."119 The majority concluded, therefore, that 
"the record is clear that taking Butler to the officers' vehicles would 
have posed a serious risk to his health."120 
2. Dissenting Opinion 
In her dissent, Judge Seymour began by arguing that the evi­
dence discovered inside Butler's trailer should have been sup­
pressed because Butler "differs significantly" from Chrisman, and 
"cannot be persuasively distinguished" from Anthon.121 Unlike the 
majority, which construed the issue in terms of the legitimacy of 
police protection of an arrestee's "health and safety," the dissent 
focused on the fact that the police made a warrantless entry into 
Butler's home despite the fact that none of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement were present.122 
Of particular importance to the dissent was the enhanced pro­
tection an individual's home receives under the Fourth Amend­
ment.123 Judge Seymour quoted at length from Payton v. New 
York124 to emphasize her point: 
the zone of privacy [is most] clearly defined ... when bounded by 
the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's home 
.... "At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the 
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free 
from unreasonable governmental intrusion." In terms that apply 
equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the 
Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the 
house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not rea­
sonably be crossed without a warrant. l25 
119. Butler, 980 F.2d at 622. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. (Seymour, J., dissenting). 
122. [d. at 622-24. 
123. [d. This theme of the home's special protected status under the Fourth 
Amendment was not mentioned in the majority opinion. 
124. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In Payton, the appellant "challenge[d] the constitution­
ality of New York statutes [ which] authorized police officers to enter a private residence 
without a warrant and with force, if necessary, to make a routine felony arrest." [d. at 
574. Acting with probable cause but without warrants, police had gone to the appel­
lant's residence to arrest the appellant based on a felony charge and had entered the 
premises without the consent of any of the occupants. [d. at 576-77. The Supreme 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making such warrantless 
and nonconsensual entries into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony 
arrest. [d. at 603. 
125. Butler, 980 F.2d at 622 (quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90 (citation 
omitted» .. 
304 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:289 
The dissent's definition of exigent circumsta,nces,126 unlike the 
examples of factual scenarios presented by the majority,127 stressed 
that since each exception "invariably impinges to some extent on 
the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment,"128 exigent cir­
cumstances must be "jealously and carefully drawn. "129 Judge Sey­
mour again stressed the location of the intrusion as primary and 
emphasized the corresponding burden on the government to estab­
lish exigent circumstances" 'because warrantless searches inside a 
home are presumptively unreasonable."'130 
Judge Seymour criticized the paucity of factual evidence upon 
which the majority justified the warrantless entryl3l and proceeded 
to argue that Butler was controlled by the Tenth Circuit's holding in 
the factually indistinguishable Anthon case. Like Anthon, Judge 
Seymour noted, the police in Butler were not responding to an 
emergency, were not in "hot pursuit" of a suspect, and were not 
attempting to prevent the destruction of evidence.132 
Judge Seymour found "significant" the Anthon court's empha­
sis on the lack of evidence that Anthon had requested to return to 
126. Id. 
127. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text for discussion of the three 
cases relied upon by the majority. Judge Seymour also noted the situation in which 
'''the search [is not] motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence. ", 980 F.2d at 
622 (quoting United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1986» (other citation 
omitted) (Seymour, J., dissenting). 
128. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623 (quoting Smith, 797 F.2d at 841 (quoting Arkansas v. 
Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759-60 (1979))). 
129. Id. at 622 (quoting United States v. Aquino, 836 F.2d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 
1988»; Smith, 797 F.2d at 841). 
130. Id. at 623 (quoting United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1452 (10th Cir. 
1989». 
131. "[T]he sole circumstance upon which the majority relies is the fact that Mr. 
Butler was arrested barefoot in a yard that was littered with flattened beer cans and 
some broken glass." Id. It is interesting to note the differing emphasis the majority and 
dissent placed on the broken glass and debris in Butler's yard. Judge Seymour, but not 
the majority, stressed that "the evidence is undisputed that.Mr. Butler and his compan­
ions, who were also barefoot, had just walked back and forth across the yard without 
injury to go to the river to bathe. Moreover, Mr. Butler did not express concern about 
the possibility of injury to his bare feet ...." Id. The majority, in stark contrast, was 
genuinely convinced from reviewing the record that "taking Butler to the officers' vehi­
cles would have posed a serious risk to his health." Id. at 622. One solution would have 
been to remand the case in order to determine which side was correct on this point, but 
the underlying issue in the "clothing cases" (whether police should be required to take 
alternative steps to minimize the invasion of privacy that entry entails) still would re­
main unanswered. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text for further elabora­
tion of this point. 
132. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623 (citing United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 675 
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982». 
305 1994] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-UNITED STATES v. BUTLER 
his room or had consented to the officers' entry into the room.133 
Using Anthon and Chrisman as "guides," Judge Seymour claimed it 
was "clear" that the government failed to "establish[ ] sufficient exi­
gent circumstances to legitimize the warrantless entry into Butler's 
home."134 She acknowledged that Chrisman allows police to ac­
company an arrestee into his room when the arrestee requests to go 
there, but she distinguished Chrisman from Butler by invoking 
Payton.135 
According to Judge Seymour, the' majority failed to realize that 
application of Chrisman was "fully dependent upon the defendant's 
request to return to his room."136 Without such a request from the 
defendant, the police have no right to enter the defendant's resi­
dence, Judge Seymour argued.137 Judge Seymour criticized the ma­
jority's reliance on Brown,138 Di Stefano,139 and Titus,140 dismissing 
it as built "on a house of cards that falls with one slight breath."141 
She proceeded to distinguish these cases from Butler by establishing 
that the "health and safety" argument, which formed the core of the 
majority's reasoning, was based either on "pure dicta"142 or factu­
ally distinguishable cases.143 
Judge Seymour concluded her dissent by touching upon the 
133. Id. (citing Anthon, 648 F.2d at 675). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980». "Chrisman cannot, 
under Payton, stand for the proposition that the officer may take an arrestee into his 
house without consent." Id. 
136. Id. (citing Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. a(6 n.3). 
137. Id. Judge Seymour reiterated the fact that the district court had not found 
evidence of either a request by Butler that the officer take him into his house or his 
consent to enter. Accord United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1164 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(Chrisman not applicable when arrestee did not invite police to accompany him to his 
room). 
138. United States v. Brown, 951 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1991). 
139. United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1977). 
140. United States v. Titus, 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 
(1971). 
141. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623. 
142. The language the majority quoted from Brown (see supra note 108 and ac­
companying text) simply reiterated the holding in Chrisman, and is pure dicta because 
an officer did not accompany anyone into a home to obtain clothing or identification in 
that case. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623-24. 
143. Di Stefano merely relied on TItus, a controlling case in the same circuit. But­
ler, 980 F.2d at 624. In TItus, the court held that a warrantless entry was justified as an 
exigent circumstance in order to prevent the defendant's escape. Titus, 445 F.2d at 578­
79. Commenting on the majority's reliance on TItus, Judge Seymour tersely stated that 
"[t]he warrantless entry of a home to prevent the escape of a defendant the police have 
probable cause to arrest is not analogous to an entry to obtain shoes for a barefoot 
arrestee who does not request them." Butler, 980 F.2d at 624. 
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three factors she had emphasized throughout her opinion: (1) un­
willingness to "dilute the concept of exigent circumstances;"I44 (2) 
the fact that the police officer, not Butler, had initiated and com­
pelled the warrantless entry; and (3) the majority's "trivializ[ing]" 
of the exception to the warrant requirement that should be "jeal­
ously and carefully drawn."145 
IV. ASSESSING THE VALIDITY OF BUTLER's "HEALTH AND 
SAFETY" ARGUMENT 
Analysis of United States v. Butler raises several troubling ques­
tions pertaining to both the majority'S reasoning and tacit assump­
tions contained in the dissenting opinion. Why, for example, did 
the majority ignore evidence that prior to the police's arrival, But­
ler and his companions had been walking back and forth across the 
yard without injury?146 Since there was no suggestion that Butler 
and his friends were inebriated or under the'influence of drugs at 
the time the police arrived, it is reasonable to infer that the condi­
tion of the yard was not as dangerous as the majority believed it to 
be.147 Additionally, as Judge Seymour detailed in her dissenting 
opinion, Chrisman and the triad of cases relied on by the majority 
are distinguishable from Butler and thus do not lend support to the 
majority's claim that "even without an express invitation as in Chr­
isman, police may conduct a limited entry into an area for the pur­
pose of protecting the health or safety of an arrestee. "148 
This does not mean that the result in Butler was incorrect, how­
ever. Though the majority'S factual and legal justification for its 
holding is suspect, the ultimate holding of the case seems inherently 
reasonable.149 The easy solution would have been to remand the 
case in order to determine precisely how dangerous the situation 
was to the shoe less arrestee. But even if remand were to take 
place, the underlying issue in Butler and the other "clothing 
cases"150 remains unaddressed by Judge Seymour, who appears to 
144. Butler, 980 F.2d at 624. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of warrantless home entries as per Payton. 
145. Butler, 980 F.2d at 624. 
146. Id. at 623, 
147. Id. at 621. 
148. Id. 
149. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text for an argument supporting 
the proposition that it is always reasonable for police to require arrestees to wear shoes. 
150. The issue is whether the police should have been required to take alternative 
steps to minimize the invasion of privacy that entry entails, and, if so, under what 
circumstances. 
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assume that even if there was some modicum of dangerous debris 
on the ground, it was unreasonable for the police to require Butler 
to obtain shoes after being arrested. Nor is this issue addressed by 
the majority, who sidestepped it entirely by rationalizing the of­
ficer's failure to obtain Butler's consent as legitimate because it was 
not done in "bad faith."151 
Before Butler can be synthesized into and distinguished from 
the larger body of "clothing cases," several distinct analytical steps 
must' be taken. First, the factual and precedential rooting of the 
"health and safety" standard invoked by the Butler majority must 
be traced. This will be accomplished by examining models utilized 
in prior "clothing cases" in order to distill the crucial elements or 
key factors of their reasoning. Next, these factors must be applied 
to Butler in order to reveal and highlight its factually-unique as­
pects. In this way, an adequate foundation can be laid for using 
Butler as precedent in future "clothing cases." 
A. 	 The "Health and Safety" Standard: Factual and Precedential 
Rooting 
As previously noted, Butler appears to be the first case in 
which the validity of a police officer obtaining clothing for the ar­
restee formed the entirety of the case; prior cases that have ad­
dressed this issue only did so as a tangential or secondary matter.152 
It is useful, however, to analyze these earlier cases in order to de­
velop a framework from which reasonable guidelines for future 
"clothing cases" can be derived. 
1. Prior Models 
The "clothing cases" can be roughly divided into two catego­
ries: (1) those in which the arrestee requests permission to retrieve 
clothing;153 and (2) those in which the police cause the defendant to 
obtain additional clothing.154 This rough distinction is useful pri­
marily as an analytic tool; it does not imply that the cases within 
each of these categories are factually indistinguishable or consistent 
in their holdings. 
151. Butler, 980 F.2d at 621. Additionally, the majority expanded the scope of 
Chrisman to include cases where an arrestee does not request to return to his residence. 
152. 	 See supra notes 51-52 for a list of these cases. 
153. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. In all of these cases, by requesting 
permission to retrieve clothing, the arrestee is deemed to have implicitly consented to 
police accompaniment when he goes into his bedroom to change (as per Chrisman). 
154. 	 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
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Cases in the first category include United States v. Whitten,155 
State v. Bruzzese,156 and State v. Griffin.157 In Whitten, the defend­
ant was arrested in the doorway of his hotel room, clad only in un­
derwear.158 The court, relying on Anthon, emphasized the 
importance of obtaining an arrestee's consent and held that the sub­
sequent warrantless entry of defendant's hotel room violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.159 "[The defendant] did not ask to be 
allowed to dress until after the officers had taken him into the room 
immediately upon his arrest and without his consent. Absent such a 
'specific request or consent,' the officers' entry was unlawful."160 
In Bruzzese, the police "arrived [at defendant's residence] at a 
reasonable hour at which it was likely that defendant would be 
dressed."161 . Despite this "reasonable" time of arrival, the defend­
ant was not fully dressed when he was arrested pursuant to a war­
rant.162 The Bruzzese court held that "the policeman's act of 
following defendant upstairs was a reasonable consequence of de­
fendant's own voluntary choice to go to his bedroom and get 
dressed. "163 
Cases in the latter category, where police require the arrestee 
to obtain clothing, include Giacalone v. Lucas,164 Walker v. United 
States,165 United States v. Kinney,166 and United States v. Anthon.167 
In Giacalone, the defendant, arrested at his home in May, 
came to the door dressed in "shorty pajamas," slippers, and a robe. 
He twice announced that he was "ready to go," but police stead­
fastly "suggested" he change into street clothes before leaving for 
his arraignment.168 Ultimately, the defendant "willingly accepted 
the suggestion."169 The trial court found the "suggestion" "per­
155. 706 F.2d 1000, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 1983). 
156. 463 A.2d 320, 334 (N.J. 1983). 
157. 336 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1983). Griffin is actually a combination of the two 
categories: apparently, the defendant himself requested that he be allowed to obtain 
his jacket, but the police also wanted to obtain shoes for the defendant. Id. at 52l. 
158. Whitten, 706 F.2d at 1015. 
159. Id. at 1015-16. 
160. Id. at 1016 (quoting United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982)). 
161. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 334 (N.J. 1983). 
162. Id. at 333-34. 
163. Id. at 334. 
164. 445 F.2d 1238, 1244-45 (6th Cir. 1971). 
165. 318 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C. 1974). 
166. 638 F.2d 941, 943 (6th Cir. 1981). 
167. 648 F.2d 669, 675 (10th Cir. 1981). 
168. Giacalone, 445 F.2d at 1244-45. 
169. Id. at 1245. 
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fectly reasonable and proper; ... it was a suggestion, not a directive 
or an order."17o Arguably, the "consent" ultimately obtained from 
Giacalone was coerced and not genuine. The dissent noted that 
there appeared to be "no motivation for appellant to have an­
nounced his readiness to go in his robe as he stood in the front 
foyer other than his desire to limit the officers' intrusion into the 
privacy of his home which they had no warrant to search."l71 
In Walker, the defendant was arrested at 6 a.m. inside his home 
in a "partially dressed" condition.l72 The police told him "he would 
need more clothes before they left" for the police station.173 Pursu­
ant to a search incident to arrest, the officers checked a closet in 
Walker's bedroom and discovered incriminating evidence.174 
In Kinney, by contrast, the defendant was arrested on the 
porch of his apartment in Cleveland, Ohio and then taken inside 
while a crowd of observers gathered.175 On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected the government's argument 
that a warrantless entry was necessary because Kinney was not fully 
clothed and a crowd was forming outside of his home.176 The court 
noted that "[t]he defendant did not request permission to secure 
additional clothing and did not consent to an entry of his home."177 
The majority also rejected the dissent's suggestion that the weather 
in March justified taking the defendant back into his apartmenU78 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reached a similar 
holding in Anthon. As detailed in the Butler opinion,179 the defend­
ant in Anthon was arrested in a hotel hallway wearing only a swim­
suit.180 The court held that "the arresting officers herein were 
authorized to search Anthon at the time of his arrest in the hotel 
hallway. However, they were not, absent Anthon's specific request 
or consent, empowered to return Anthon to his hotel room and 
there effectuate a search without benefit of a search warrant."18I 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 1256. 
172. Walker v. United States, 318 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C. 1974). 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. United States v. Kinney, 638 F.2d 941, 943 (6th Cir. 1981). 
176. Id. at 943-45. The facts of the case merely disclose that "Kinney's shirt was 
unbuttoned." Id. at 943. 
177. Id. at 945. 
178. Id. 
179. See supra notes 112-21 and 131-34 for the analysis of Anthon in the Butler 
opinion. 
180. United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1981). 
181. Id. at 675. 
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2. 	 Key Factors: Amount of Clothing and Weather 

Conditions at the Time of Arrest· 

In addition to the rough distinction employed in the previous 
subsection regarding the source of the request to obtain more cloth­
ing, further examination of these cases reveals two broad factors 
which affect courts' reasoning in deciding whether to justify a war­
rantless entry in a "clothing case." 
The first factor, not surprisingly, is simply the amount of cloth­
ing the defendant is wearing at the time of the arrest. The most 
extreme examples, and therefore the easiest cases, are those like 
United States v. Titus,182 where the defendant was naked at the time 
of arrest.183. More frequent is the situation encountered in Walker 
v. United States,184 where the arrestee was only "partially 
dressed,"185 or, as in Giacalone v. Lucas,186 wearing bed clothes be­
cause the police arrived at his or her home early in the morning.187 
Although it is often interrelated with the first factor, the sec­
ond factor that plays a major role in courts' reasoning is the weather 
conditions at the time of the arrest. The more inclement the condi­
tions, the more likely it is that a court will hold that an officer's act 
of obtaining clothing for an arrestee was justified. A typical exam­
ple is State v. Griffin,188 where the defendant was arrested in De­
cember in the hallway of his rooming house dwelling.189 Snow was 
covering the ground, prompting police to enter the defendant's 
room to obtain his shoes. l90 At trial, the defendant argued that the 
officers should have given him the choice of walking in his socks 
through the snow to the police cruiser; if he was denied this option 
and refused to let the police enter his room, the officers could have 
carried him to their car.191 The court, not surprisingly, flatly re­
jected this suggestion.192 
Logical inferences from the Anthon opinion demonstrate that 
weather conditions at the time of arrest can sometimes work in the 
arrestee's favor. In Anthon, the defendant was arrested in Albu­
182. 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971). 
183. Id. at 578. 
184. 318 A.2d 290 (D.C. 1974). 
185. Id. at 291. 
186. 445 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971). 
187. Id. at 1244-45. 
188. 336 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1983). 
189. Id. at 521. 
190. In addition, the defendant had said that he wanted to retrieve his jacket. Id. 
191. Id. at 524 n.2. 
192. Id. 
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querque, New Mexico, during the month of September.193 Despite 
the fact that he was clad only in a swimsuit, the Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit194 held that the police should have taken 
Anthon to the station as he was, rather than forcing him to go back 
into his hotel room to change.195 The (presumably) balmy weather 
conditions in New Mexico in September are distinguishable from 
the snowy Minneapolis December weather conditions in Griffin, 
which justified the police officers' requirement that the arrestee ob­
tain additional clothing.196 
B. Application of Key Factors to Butler 
1. Lack of Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement 
It is important to note that the warrantless entry in Butler was 
not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement. Judge 
Seymour recognized that "the government here has not established 
sufficient exigent circumstances to legitimize the warrantless entry 
into Mr. Butler's home."l97 There was no hot pursuit involved, no 
need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, and no 
emergency which threatened the life of another.198 As the United 
States Supreme Court stated in Vale v. Louisiana,199 an arrest 
outside of the arrestee's premises does not "provide its own 'exi­
gent circumstance' so as to justify a warrantless search of the arres­
tee's house."2oo 
Nor can the entry be justified by invoking the consent excep­
tion, for, unlike the arrestee in Chrisman, Butler did not consent to 
the police entry by requesting to enter his residence. "The analysis 
in Chrisman is fully dependent upon the defendant's request to re­
turn to his room ...."201 Butler was not afforded an opportunity to 
"freely and voluntarily"202 consent to the entry, as the officer 
193. United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 671 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,454 
U.S. 1164 (1982). 
194. Both Anthon and Butler are Tenth Circuit cases, although the courts were 
composed of entirely different members save for Judge Seymour. 
195. Anthon, 648 F.2d at 674-76. 
196. State v. Griffin, 336 N.W.2d 519, 520-21 (Minn. 1983). 
197. United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 619, 623 (10th Cir. 1992) (Seymour, J., 
dissenting). 
198. See supra notes 69-86 and accompanying text for the facts of United States v. 
Butler. 
199. 399 U.S. 30 (1970). 
200. [d. at 35. 
201. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623 (Seymour, J., dissenting). See Washington v. Chris­
man, 455 U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1982). 
202. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983). "[W]here the validity of a 
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barged in without seeking Butler's permission.203 
Finally, the warrantless entry cannot be justified as a search 
incident to arrest. Butler was arrested, searched for weapons, and 
handcuffed outside his residence.204 There were no weapons within 
his reach and no physical evidence he could grab and destroy or use 
to harm the arresting officers, thus precluding a Chime(205-type 
search of the house incident to the arrest. "If a search of a house is 
to be upheld as incident to an arrest, that arrest must take place 
inside the house.''206 
2. Clothing and Weather Factors in Butler 
Assessing both the amount of clothing and weather condition 
factors in Butler presents a unique mixture of problems. Butler was 
arrested on a presumably warm April day in Oklahoma. According 
to the dissent, before the police arrived, the defendant had been 
bathing in a river next to his trailer.207 The Butler opinion is un­
clear as to whether Butler was still in his swimsuit at the time of 
arrest, or if he had dressed. It is clear from prior case law, however, 
that if Butler was only wearing shoes and a swimsuit, the warm 
weather would have precluded police entry of his residence.208 
State v. Griffin209 provides a useful comparison for assessing 
the clothing issue in Butler. In Griffin, the shoeless defendant was 
arrested in the hallway of his rooming house residence early on a 
snowy December morning.210 After the arrest, police asked de­
fendant which room was his, because they wanted to obtain shoes 
search rests on consent, the State has the burden of proving that the necessary consent 
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied 
by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority." Id. 
203. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
204. Butler, 980 F.2d at 620. 
205. ChimeI v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
206. United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1016 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1100 (1984) (citing Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1970)) (emphasis 
added). Cf. Walker v. United States, 318 A.2d 290, 290-91 (D.C. 1974) (search of closet, 
which contained partially-dressed defendant's clothing, for weapons, was incident to 
arrest, since closet was area from which defendant might have gained weapon at time 
when he was obtaining additional clothing). 
207. Butler, 980 F.2d at 623. 
208. In this situation, lack of consent or exigent circumstances would have pro­
hibited the police from entering. See discussion of Kinney, supra notes 175-78 and ac­
companying text, and the discussion of Anthon, supra notes 193-95 and accompanying 
text. 
209. 336 N.W.2d 519 (Minn. 1983). 
210. Id. at 521. 
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for him.211 Upon entering defendant's room, the police observed in 
plain view a purse that had been reported as stolen.212 At trial, the 
arresting officer testified that defendant had said that he wanted to 
get his jacket before he was taken to the police station.213 Even if 
defendant had not made this request, however, it seems clear that 
because of the snow-covered ground, the court would have held 
that police concern alone would have been sufficient to justify a 
limited entry into Griffin's room to obtain shoes for him, despite his 
objection. Indeed, the Griffin court specifically rejected the de­
fendant's argument that the officers should have allowed him to 
either walk through the snow in his socks or be carried to the police 
cruiser.214 Like the majority opinion in Butler, the Griffin court as­
sumed a priori that police should not be required to take alternative 
steps to minimize the invasion of privacy that entry into a residence 
entails.215 
C. 	 The Factually Unique Aspects of Butler and its Potential Role 
as Precedent 
The sparse simplicity of the facts in Butler belie a unique amal­
gamation: had Marshal AUberry not made his harried entry,216 But
ler would have been identical to Griffin, and the defendant would 
have rightfully had the burden to demonstrate that the entry was 
not justified. But, unlike Griffin or other previous "clothing cases," 
Butler contained the unique combination of a real danger to the 
arrestee and the lack of opportunity for the arrestee to consent to 
entry. As a result, the majority stretched the case in order to fit it 
within the reasoning of recognized, but inapposite, precedent. 
This unique quality of Butler affords the opportunity to de­
velop guidelines which can govern future Butler-type cases,217 as 
well as consistently and fairly resolve the garden variety type of 
"clothing cases."218 Instead of distorting the case by forcing it into 
ill-fitting precedential molds, it can serve as a vehicle for addressing 
211. 	 Id. 
212. 	 Id. 
213. 	 Id. 
214. 	 Id. at 524 n.2. 
215. 	 Id. 
216. 	 United States v. Butler, 980 F.2d 619, 620 (10th Cir. 1992). 
217. Butler-type cases may be defined as those rare cases in which: (1) a real 
danger to the arrestee exists and (2) the arrestee is not given an opportunity to consent 
to police entry of his residence. 
218. By "garden variety," I mean the typical "clothing case" scenario in which the 
arresting officer manifests a desire to obtain additional clothing for the arrestee and 
314 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:289 
more difficult, and thus far unanswered questions regarding 
whether and when police should take less intrusive means to mini­
mize privacy invasions in "clothing cases." 
V. PROPOSAL FOR A WORKABLE MODEL 
A model which adequately instructs police officers on what ac­
tion they may take in future "clothing cases" must balance the po­
lice officers' need for "bright line" rules219 against the privacy an 
individual lawfully enjoys in his or her home under the Fourth 
Amendment. It must seek to prevent the destruction of evidence 
without becoming "a blank check for intrusion upon the privacy of 
the sloppily dressed."220 The model must also attempt to account 
for the countless variety of factual situations- which can arise within 
the standard "clothing case" paradigm221 while simultaneously ac­
knowledging the discretion police officers legitimately possess.222 It 
must find a balance between the legitimate governmental interest in 
protecting police officers and the significant intrusion upon an indi­
vidual's privacy that a warrantless entry necessarily entails.223 
Finally, if the model is to be effective, it must anticipate resist­
ance to its implementation on the federal level and thus pragmati­
cally possess an alternative means of implementation. As such, the 
model would be implemented pursuant to states' constitutional 
counterparts to the Fourth Amendment. 
then makes an entry to obtain this clothing. See supra notes 164-81 for examples of 
such cases. 
219. As I argue infra Part VB in the subsection entitled "Establishment of a 
'Clothing Spectrum,'" there should be very few "bright lines" in the "clothing case" 
context. The rationale for this argument is straightforward: "Not only do categorical 
Fourth Amendment rules often lead to substantial injustice; in addition, their artificial­
ity commonly makes them difficult ... to apply." Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line 
Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PnT. L. REV. 227,231 (1984). But see infra 
note 226, presenting arguments by two "bright line" proponents. The most seasoned 
and zealous advocate of the "bright line" approach, however, is Professor LaFave. See, 
e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing 
"Bright Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PrIT. L. REV. 307 (1982); Wayne R. LaFave, 
"Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Di­
lemma, 1974 SUP. Cr. REV. 127, 141-42. 
220. Butler, 980F.2d at 621. 
221. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text. 
222. "American police have always been expected to exercise discretion in the 
performance of their duties." Gregory H. Williams, Police Rulemaking Revisited: Some 
New Thoughts on an Old Problem, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn, 1984, at 123, 
181. 
223. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 
(1968). 
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No "magic formula" or all-inclusive test, however, will cover 
every future case pertaining to this narrow Fourth Amendment is­
sue. Inevitably, a unique situation will arise224 which upon applica­
tion of the guidelines to be outlined in this section, will yield a 
result which may seem inherently unfair, unreasonable, or simply 
unsatisfactory. Acknowledging this limitation, I submit that em­
ployment of the following broadstroke guidelines would provide a 
more equitable solution to the majority of future "clothing cases." 
A. 	 The "Least Intrusive Alternative" Framework and Protection 
Pursuant to State Constitutions 
Several scholars have argued that the United States Supreme 
Court has increasingly refrained from categorical application of 
"bright line" rules in the Fourth Amendment context, preferring 
instead to apply a "general reasonableness" or "balancing" test.225 
Despite the criticism this balancing methodology has received,226 it 
is likely that the Supreme Court, given its current composition· and 
conservative leanings in the criminal procedure context,227 will con­
tinue its preference for a balancing approach. Recognizing this 
trend, one commentator has responded with the following argu­
ment, which should provide the underlying principle to govern po­
lice action in future "clothing cases": 
so that the Court does not continue to undervalue privacy and 
liberty rights, or ... inflate the countervailing law enforcement 
interests . . . the balancing analysis must compare the marginal 
costs and benefits of alternative search and seizure techniques, 
and uphold a particular technique only if it is the least intrusive 
measure that substantially promotes the state's goals.228 
Although it is uncertain whether this principle would be utilized 
224. 	 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
225. Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REv. 473, 477 (1991); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth 
Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive 
Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1175-76 (1988). 
226. Bookspan, supra note 225, at 477, criticizes the Supreme Court's "reasona­
bleness" approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as a standard which "focuses 
on the acts of the police instead of the rights of the people." Similarly, Strossen, supra 
note 225, at 1175-76, argues that "Fourth Amendment rights ... should receive the 
more certain protection resulting from categorical rules rather than the less certain pro­
tection resulting from ad hoc balancing." 
227. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, Drugs, Ideology, and the Deconstitutionaliza
tion of Criminal Procedure, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1992); Robin West, Progressive 
and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 641, 641-42 (1990). 
228. 	 Strossen, supra note 225, at 1266 (emphasis added). 
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by the current Supreme Court,229 a least intrusive alternative re­
quirement can and should be embraced by state courts pursuant to 
their individual state constitutions. The federalist framework enti­
tles states to grant their citizens greater protection in search and 
seizure cases, pursuant to their state constitutions' Fourth Amend­
ment counterparts, than they would receive under the Federal Con­
stitution.230 In this situation, so long as the court indicates that its 
decision is based on independent state grounds, the decision will 
not be overturned by the United States Supreme Court.231 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly recognized this 
principle, having proclaimed that "a State is free as a matter of its 
own law to impose greater restrictions on police activity than those 
this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional stan­
dards."232 Examples of such state departures in the Fourth Amend­
229. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983) ("The reasonableness 
of any particular governmental activity does· not necessarily or invariably turn on the 
existence of alternative 'less intrusive' means."). But see Horida v. Royer, 460 u.S. 491, 
500 (1983) (warrantless investigative detentions must last no longer than is necessary 
and should employ the "least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel 
the officer's suspicion"). The composition of the Supreme Court, of course, has 
changed since these opinions were written. Yet, as of this writing, the Court has not 
explicitly rejected the "least intrusive alternative" framework. 
230. Extensive treatment of this doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note. For 
further analysis, see Edward G. Mascolo, Arrest Warrants & Search Warrants in the 
Home: Payton v. New York Revisited & Modified Under State Constitutional Law, 66 
CONN. B. J. 333, 355-58 (1992), and Edward G. Mascolo, Probable Cause Revisited: 
Some Disturbing Implications Emanating from Illinois v. Gates, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 331, 332-33 (1983) (both articles arguing that states must protect individuals' 
Fourth Amendment freedom under state law); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitu­
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) ("state 
courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the 
federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their 
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpreta­
tion of federal law."); Shirley G. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: 
The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141,1141-42 (1985) (em­
phasizing the "states as laboratories" viewpoint of constitutional law whereby state leg­
islatures be allowed to experiment with social and economic legislation); James W. 
Talbot, Comment, Rethinking Civil Liberties Under the Washington State Constitution, 
66 WASH. L. REV. 1099 (1991) (examining the Washington Supreme Court's departure 
from the holding in the Supreme Court's "trash case," California v. Greenwood, 486 
U.S. 35 (1988)); Marielise Kelly, Comment, Fourth Amendment Possessory Crimes: The 
Doctrine of Automatic Standing Endures in Massachusetts, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 306 
(1991) (examining the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's upholding of automatic 
standing in Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990)). 
231. Provided that the state guarantee does not intrude upon a separate federal 
constitutional right. See Talbot, supra note 230, at 1104 nn.36-38 and accompanying 
text. 
232. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,719 (1975). 
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ment context are legion. In State v. Miller,233 for example, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Supreme Court's 
holding in Chambers v. Maroney234 by prohibiting warrantless auto­
mobile searches supported by probable cause but conducted while 
the automobile was impounded at police station, by ruling that arti­
cle first, section 7, of the Connecticut constitution provides broader 
protection than the Fourth Amendment. 
Similarly, in State v. Boland,235 the Washington Supreme Court 
held that Washington citizens have a state constitutional right to 
privacy in their garbage, completely contrary to the United States 
Supreme Court's holding in California v. Greenwood.236 Finally, in 
Commonwealth v. Amendola,237 the Massachusetts Supreme Judi­
cial Court, interpreting article fourteen of the Massachusetts consti­
tution, held that a defendant charged with illegal possession of 
drugs has automatic standing to contest the legality of the seizure, 
without asserting any privacy interest in the area where the police 
seized the drugs.238 By upholding the automatic standing doctrine, 
the Amendola court declined to follow the "one-step" standing test 
laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Rakas v. Illinois.239 
These state-based departures from the United States Supreme 
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence dovetail with and but­
tress Professor Strossen's proposed "least intrusive alternative" re­
quirement. Professor Strossen developed this analysis after 
surveying pertinent lower federal and state supreme court decisions 
and concluding that, "despite the Supreme Court's unfavorable rul­
ings on point, ample room remains for imposing a least intrusive 
alternative requirement in Fourth Amendment cases."240 Professor 
Strossen acknowledged that "[t]he opinions in these cases tend to 
233. 630 A.2d 1315, 1326 (Conn. 1993). 
234. 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970) (Fourth Amendment permits warrantless automo­
bile search supported by probable cause and conducted while automobile is impounded 
at police station). 
235. 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990). For analysis of this case, see Talbot, supra note 
230, at 1105-07. 
236. 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988) (Fourth Amendment does not prohibit search and 
seizure of garbage, since one cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's 
garbage). 
237. 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990). 
238. [d. at 125·26. Interestingly, the Amendola court arrived at this conclusion 
despite the fact that the two constitutional provisions were "virtually identical in their 
language and history." Kelly, supra note 230, at 313 n.37 and accompanying text. 
239. 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (defendant may exclude evidence derived from a search 
or seizure only if his legitimate expectation of privacy is violated). 
240, Strossen, supra note 225, at 1231. 
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focus on the particular situation presented, with little analysis and 
few citations to other authorities,"241 but concluded that "when 
these isolated rulings are considered together, there emerges a co­
herent, comprehensive doctrine requiring that searches and seizures 
comply with the least intrusive alternative standard."242 
Professor Strossen then presented an exhaustive compilation 
of cases in which the least intrusive alternative requirement had 
been accepted, amounting to seventeen United States courts of ap­
peals decisions from eight different circuits, including the Tenth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals,243 as well as twelve different United States 
district court decisions from ten different states and the District of 
Columbia.244 
Although the cases cited by Professor Strossen differ from 
Miller, Boland, and Amendola,245 when they are considered in con­
junction with the methodology in these three cases they enhance 
and strengthen the least intrusive alternative framework. In this 
manner, the least intrusive alternative framework becomes a viable, 
constitutionally-based solution to the "clothing case" dilemma. 
L Specific Proposals 
In order to effectively implement the goal of requiring police 
to take the least intrusive alternative in future "clothing cases," 
states246 should constitutionally require that the following247 proce­
241. Id. at 1232. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. at 1232-33 n.344 (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127, 1133 
(10th Cir. 1985) (in suppressing evidence after police officer had coerced a suspect to go 
to the police station for investigation without arresting him, the court noted "reason­
able alternatives," including calling for a backup officer, obtaining the suspect's consent 
to search, and obtaining the suspect's consent to drive his car to safer location)). 
244. Id. at 1233-34 n.345. 
245. The difference being that the cases cited by Professor Strossen are not state­
based departures from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 
246. Requiring that the states constitutionally mandate standard procedures in 
"clothing cases" is a pragmatic tactical maneuver consistent with the well-established 
tradition of using the states as "laboratories" to experiment with various social and 
economic legislation. As Justice Brandeis proclaimed in 1932: 
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and 
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country .... If we would 
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold. 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Since this case was decided, "other United States Supreme Court Justices have applied 
the Brandeis laboratory metaphor to state courts as well as to state legislatures, and to 
criminal law as well as to social and economic legislation." Abrahamson, supra note 
230, at 1141. 
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dures and guidelines be incorporated into police manuals: (a) 
where reasonably possible, police should attempt to obtain the ar­
restee's consent to enter; (b) where reasonably possible, police 
should request that a third party render assistance; and (c) a "cloth­
ing spectrum" should be established in order to guide police in 
making reasonable, non-technical on-site determinations in future 
"clothing cases." 
The reason for requiring that these proposed procedures and 
guidelines be constitutionally mandated is simple: if they were not, 
they would undoubtedly be reduced to mere aspirational or op­
tional police procedure, thus thwarting the goal behind the guide­
lines by perpetuating "clothing case" status-quo. 
The benefits of written procedures248 accrue to both police of­
ficers and arrestees; officers become aware of the parameters of 
what is deemed "reasonable" police action in specified circum­
stances,249 while arrestees are protected from arbitrariness and ex­
treme exercises of unfair police discretion.250 Written procedures 
can thus mitigate the possibility of Fourth Amendment violations 
inherent in all "clothing cases."2S1 
a. Obtaining the Arrestee's Consent to Enter 
The first element of the least intrusive alternative requires the 
police to attempt to obtain the arrestee's consent prior to making a 
247. See infra notes 252-82 and accompanying text. 
248. Professor LaFave suggests that departmental policymaking regarding the 
Fourth Amendment improves police performance in the following four ways: by (1) 
enhancing the quality of police decisions; (2) ensuring fair and equal treatment of citi­
zens; (3) increasing the visibility of police policy decisions; and (4) promoting consis­
tency in police officers' obedience and enforcement of constitutional norms, which 
guarantees citizens' liberty. LaFave, supra note 4, at 451 (citing Anthony G. Amster­
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 423-28 (1974». 
249. As an example, consider the holdings in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 
U.S. 364 (1976) and Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (both cases upholding 
inventory search of impounded cars conducted pursuant to standardized police proce­
dures). In both of these cases, however, the scope of the searches allowed pursuant to 
the written guidelines was quite broad. The procedures in Bertine, for example, allowed 
police to open a closed backpack and a nylon bag found inside the backpack. [d. at 369. 
Compare Bertine and Opperman with Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (opening of 
locked suitcase not justified as an inventory search where police department had no 
written policy concerning the opening of closed containers). 
250. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 219, at 228, stating that "[w]hen rules can 
limit the play of atomistic, idiosyncratic choice without yielding significant injustice ... 
they should be adopted." 
251. In order for written procedures to mitigate the possibility of Fourth Amend­
ment violations, the procedures must not, of course, grant carte blanche to the arresting 
officers. See supra note 249. 
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warrantless entry. Explaining the need for the arrestee to wear 
shoes or additional clothing because of the cold weather outside, 
for example, may result in obtaining a valid consent to enter. Such 
consent, if validly obtained, would render the need for further pro­
cedures moot. Case law reveals that the arrestee may often have 
concerns for his or her health and safety and thus freely choose to 
obtain more clothing before departing.252 
A critic may respond that the "consent" obtained in these cir­
cumstances is a meaningless formality, since the police may ulti­
mately be privileged to enter regardless of whether the arrestee 
consents.253 The response to this criticism is to note that although 
police may be privileged to enter in a limited set of circumstances, 
the majority of "clothing cases" involve a totality of circumstances 
in which entry is not privileged. In these latter cases, requesting 
that the arrestee allow entry vests ultimate decision-making power 
in the arrestee and thus allows him or her to make a meaningful 
response which must be honored. 
b. Requesting a Third Party to Render Assistance 
The second element of a least intrusive alternative requirement 
in the "clothing case" context requires that the police, if possible, 
request another (non-police and non-arrestee) individual to re­
trieve clothing for the arrestee rather than making the entry them­
selves. This procedure is consistent with the twin objectives that 
should underlie and guide the "least intrusive alternative" policy: it 
allows police to respond to true health and safety concerns while 
simultaneously respecting the arrestee's legitimate privacy interests 
and preventing warrantless entries. Requiring that police request a 
third party to render assistance does not unreasonably restrict po­
lice action, as the officers in "clothing cases" only possess an arrest 
warrant, and thus are not authorized to search the defendant's 
residence. 
The assumption behind this prong of the proposal is that entry 
would be made by a friend or family member of the arrestee, not an 
agent of the government. Undoubtedly, situations will arise in 
which the defendant is home alone when arrested.254 But it is rea­
252. See supra note 51 for a list of these cases. 
253. See infra part VB regarding the establishment of a "clothing spectrum" 
which automatically allows police to enter, even if the arrestee refuses, in a narrowly­
defi'ned set of circumstances. 
254. It is possible that the defendant in Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238 (6th 
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972), was alone when arrested. The facts of the 
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son able to posit that when an arrest occurs at an individual's home, 
there will often be other individuals present who could safely aid 
both the police and the arrestee. 
Several warrantless entries could have been avoided by requir­
ing that this rudimentary procedure be followed. In Walker v. 
United States, for example, the defendant's mother was present 
when the police arrived at his home.255 Similarly, in State v. Bruz­
zese, the court noted that "[e]ven after the police told the defendant 
they would have to accompany him, he could have declined to go 
upstairs or asked his aunt at that point to get his clothes."256 
This procedure must be sensitive to the need to protect both 
officers' safety and the integrity of the arrests.257 Consequently, if 
police had specific and articulable facts that the arrestee's friends or 
family members could obtain a weapon or destroy evidence upon 
entering the home, the requirement of requesting third party assist­
ance would be deemed impracticable and thus excused. Arresting 
officers frequently possess such specific and articulable facts, based 
on the nature and circumstances of the arrest warrant they are serv­
ing and the arrestee's prior criminal record. For example, using the 
facts of United States v. Butler,258 if a warrant was being served on 
an individual who had no prior criminal record and was being ar­
rested for a non-violent crime (such as failure to make child-sup­
port payments), police would be required to request one of his 
friends to enter the house and retrieve the arrestee's shoes. 
Unfortunately, there are not enough facts regarding the nature 
of Butler's arrest warrant to accurately apply this test to Butler. 
Regarding the arrest warrant, the majority opinion merely stated 
that "Butler ... had previously been convicted of a crime punish­
able by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year."259 The ma­
jority opinion, however, did detail the confrontation on Butler's 
front porch. "Allberry [the police officer] asked Butler if he had 
any shoes. Butler said that he did, but that they were in the trailer. 
case state that police saw an "unidentified person" leave when they arrived on the 
scene, and there is no evidence that anyone else, save for the defendant, was inside the 
house thereafter. Id. at 1244-45. 
255. 318 A.2d 290, 291 (D.C. 1974); see supra notes 172-74 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of this case. 
256. 463 A.2d 320, 334 (N.J. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984); see supra 
notes 161-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. 
257. See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1,7 (1982); Chimel v. California, 
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
258. 980 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1992). 
259. [d. at 620. 
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[Butler's housemate] asked his girlfriend, who was also present, if 
she would get Butler's shoes. Allberry told Butler, 'Well, let's go 
on in and get them. "'260 
Even if there were no specific and articulable facts to which the 
officer could point to justify fearing for his safety if he allowed one 
of Butler's friends to retrieve Butler's shoes, the officer effectively 
precluded a legitimate entry by these individuals by entering But­
ler's home on his own initiative. It is entirely possible, however, 
that Butler was being arrested for a violent crime, or had a record 
of violent crime. Indeed, the officer's discovery of the guns in But­
ler's home suggests the possibility that had Butler's friend's girl­
friend been permitted to enter the trailer and retrieve Butler's 
shoes, she could have used the gun to injure the arresting officers. 
The requirement that the police request a third party to enter 
and retrieve the arrestee's clothing is thus subject to significant limi­
tations and must, ultimately, err on the side of caution. Police must 
be allowed to enter based on specific and articulable facts that they 
would have legitimately feared for their safety if a third party entry 
took place. However, case law reveals that the possibility of a safe 
third party entry is far from categorically unreasonable.261 
B. Establishment of a "Clothing Spectrum" 
In order to inform officers of what clothing situations predicate 
a warrantless and consentless entry, a rough "clothing spectrum" 
must be compiled for reference in police manuals. The principal 
distinction underlying this spectrum is between comfort and safety. 
Articles of clothing which merely relate to comfort do not justify a 
warrantless entry, while articles pertaining to safety justify entry 
even over the objection of the arrestee. As long as the arrestee is 
wearing an amount of clothing which satisfies the minimal require­
ments of public decency262 and provides sufficient protection 
against the elements, upon arrest, he or she must be taken to the 
police station "as is." 
With this broadstroke guiding principle, the legitimacy of po­
260. [d. 
261. Examples of safe third party entries can be seen in the totality of the circum­
stances surrounding the arrests of the defendants in Walker and Bruzzese. For a de­
scription of these circumstances, see supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. 
262. If the arrestee was clothed in a see-through nightgown or similar garb, the 
police would be justified in requiring that the arrestee obtain more "appropriate" cloth­
ing, even though the clothing may be sufficient protection against the elements. See 
infra notes 268-71 and accompanying text. 
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lice entry in each "clothing case" becomes a crucial question to be 
resolved by the finder of fact; mere "good faith" on the part of an 
officer does not transform a clearly "comfort-based" entry into a 
legitimate "safety-based" entry. Instead, a "good faith comfort­
based" entry should be unconstitutional as a matter of law, and thus 
result in the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to this ille­
gal entry.263 
An interrelated branch of the comfort/safety distinction is the 
weather conditions extant at the location and timing of arrest.264 
As an example, assume the following facts of State v. Griffin: snow­
covered ground and cold, December Minnesota weather at the time 
of the arrest.265 Accordingly, entry predicated on the officer's in­
terest in obtaining a hat or scarf for the otherwise fully dressed ar­
restee would be deemed illegitimate while an entry to obtain a coat 
may well be justified. A hat or scarf would provide additional, but 
unnecessary, "comfort" to the arrestee, while shoes and a jacket are 
requisite "safety" wear in such climates. Articles of clothing are not 
intrinsically "comfort" or "safety" based;266 rather, their categoriza­
tion varies267 according to specific weather conditions, location of 
arrest, and modicum of clothing worn by the defendant at the time 
of arrest. It is ultimately the factfinder's duty to determine whether 
the combination of these factors justified police entry in a given 
case. 
On one end of the spectrum are clear cases like United States v. 
Titus,268 where the defendant was naked at the time of arrest.269 
Under this proposal, nakedness is a "bright line" which would allow 
the police to make a unilateral entry even if the arrestee objects. 
Clearly, health and safety concerns as well as public decency man­
263. Suppressing evidence obtained as a result of a "good faith comfort-based" 
entry would occur pursuant to the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. See, e.g., 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (contraband taken from defendant's 
residence was fruit of agents' illegal entry and should not have been admitted as 
evidence). 
264. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text. 
265. 336 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1983). 
266. Another way of conceptualizing this statement is to say that articles of cloth­
ing are not irrevocably tied to one location on the "clothing spectrum." For example, a 
pair of trousers would be required if the arrest occurred in Alaska, but they would not 
be required if the arrest occurred in the Hawaiian tropics. In the Hawaiian case, shorts 
or a swimsuit would suffice. 
267. For hygienic and safety reasons, however, the arrestee should always be re­
quired to wear shoes. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text. 
268. 445 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 (1971). 
269. [d. at 578. 
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date that the arrestee be required to wear some modicum of cloth­
ing when he is taken to the police station.270 In these cases, the 
police will be privileged to enter the arrestee's residence, even if the 
arrestee objects. In such a scenario, the officer's legitimate concern 
for the threat posed to the arrestee's health and safety "trumps" the 
arrestee's privacy expectations and refusal to permit police entry.271 
On the other end of the spectrum is the situation where a po­
lice officer merely deems the arrestee's clothing "inappropriate," 
even though neither safety concerns nor weather conditions render 
the amount or type of the arrestee's clothing entirely unreasonable. 
In Giacalone v. Lucas,272 for example, the defendant was arrested 
in May, dressed in pajamas, bathrobe, and slippers.273 Similarly, in 
Di Stefano, the defendant was arrested in June,. wearing a night­
gown and a bathrobe.274 
Giacalone and Di Stefano are ideal illustrations of the most 
egregious type of police abuse of power occurring in the "~lothing 
case" context, and thus provide the ultimate justification for the 
least intrusive alternative arguII\ent. Rather than allow the arrestee 
to be transported clothed in the adequate amount of clothing cur­
rently worn, officers in these cases require that the arrestee change 
into "street clothing" before he or she is allowed to leave for the 
police station.275 Examining the facts in these cases, it is difficult to 
argue that the resulting entries are anything other than pre textual. 
No less an authority than Professor LaFave, however, argues 
that these entries are justified..Commenting on Giacalone, he 
opined that" [a ]ssuming a lawful arrest at the defendant's residence, 
it does not seem at all unreasonable for the police to require the 
defendant to don street clothing, without regard to his wishes."276 
Professor LaFave's argument is consistent with the Giacalone ma­
jority opinion, which assumed without question that police were 
270. A Massachusetts prosecutor related the story of a (non-reported) district 
court case in which a woman was arrested naked in a wheelchair and brought into the 
courtroom covered only with a bedsheet. Clearly the arresting officers in this case were 
negligent in failing to obtain any clothing for the arrestee. 
271. This was the precise situation in Griffin. See supra notes 209-14. 
272. 445 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972). 
273. Id. at 1244. 
274. United States v. Di Stefano, 555 F.2d 1094, 1097 (2d Cir. 1977). 
275. Compare State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 334 (N.J. 1983), where the court 
noted that "[i]f defendant, partially clad, had elected to depart from his house with the 
police, the officers could not have entered his bedroom without a search warrant." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
276. LAFAVE, supra note 32, § 6A(a) at 638. 
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privileged to enter the defendant's residence simply because the de­
fendant was wearing his "bed clothes" when he was arrested.277 
The least intrusive alternative, in contrast, would grant the arrestee 
the choice of either going to the police station in his then-current 
state of (un)dress278 or retrieving some clothing for himself, subject 
to police accompaniment as per Washington v. Chrisman.279 
Somewhere between these two extremes280 lie cases such as 
Butler where the arrestee is not wearing shoes and mayor may not 
be in danger281 due to debris on the ground at the arrest site. Even 
if he or she is not in immediate danger, however, the range of safety 
concerns stemming from an arrestee's lack of shoes places cases like 
Butler closer to Titus' "naked" end of the spectrum. Concerns for 
the shoe less arrestee's safety do not end once he is transported 
from his residence to the police car; he may be injured en route 
from the police car to the' police station or when he is finally jailed. 
There are also legitimate hygiene concerns at every stage of the 
procedure. 
As a result, it seems inherently reasonable for the police to 
always require that an arrestee have some type of footwear, appro­
priate to the location and weather conditions at the site of the 
arrest.282 Sandals would suffice for an arrest made in a warm cli­
277. Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1245 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
922 (1972). 
278. The arrestee could not elect to go to the police station if he was naked or 
shoeless at the time of the arrest. Nudity and shoelessness are thus two "bright lines" in 
the clothing spectrum. Additional constraints include weather conditions, location of 
arrest, and modicum of clothing worn by the defendant at the time of arrest. See supra 
notes 264·71 and accompanying text. 
279. 455 U.S. 1 (1982). Cases such as United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669, 674­
75 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982) (arrestee should have been al­
lowed to go to police station wearing only his swimsuit), and United States v. Kinney, 
638 F.2d 941, 945 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981) ("March" weather did not 
justify taking defendant back into his house to obtain more clothing) are consistent with 
this proposal, while cases such as Giacalone and Di Stefano would be overruled. See 
also State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320, 334 (N.J. 1983) ("If defendant, partially clad, had 
elected to depart from his house with the police, the officers could not have entered his 
bedroom without a search warrant. "). 
280. Cases between these two extremes lie in the middle of the "clothing 
spectrum." 
281. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. 
282. Judge Seymour, however, clearly disagrees with this proposition. In the pe­
nultimate sentence of her dissent, she argued that "[t]aking an arrestee in bare feet 
across a littered yard he has just traversed safely presents no greater exigency than 
taking an arrestee to the police station in his bathing suit" (the situation upheld in 
United States v. Anthon, 648 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 
(1982». Butler, 980 F.2d at 624 (Seymour, J., dissenting). Although I am inclined to 
side with Judge Seymour on the factual issue regarding the amount of danger Butler 
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mate, but in a winter context a police officer would be justified in 
requiring that an arrestee wear more appropriate footwear. The 
ability for police to make such reasonable, non-technical judg­
ments283 pursuant to this clothing spectrum is the anchor which 
removes it from the realm of the theoretical and grounds it in the 
pragmatic. In the vast majority of "clothing cases" the clothing 
spectrum can provide a method for calculating a sufficient modicum 
of protection for the health and safety of the arrestee while corre­
spondingly respecting his or her Fourth Amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the factual and legal analysis performed by the But­
ler majority i~ suspect, the ultimate holding of the case seems inher­
ently reasonable. Butler presented the factually-unique 
combination of a real danger to the arrestee and the lack of oppor­
tunity for the arrestee to consent to the police entry. Despite the 
fact that neither the majority nor the dissent analyzed it as such, 
this unique combination provides the ideal framework from which a 
"least intrusive alternative" requirement for future "clothing cases" 
can be developed. 
States should implement a least intrusive alternative frame­
work in their constitutional counterparts to the Fourth Amendment 
in order to minimize the invasion of privacy that warrantless entry 
in the "clothing case" context necessarily entails. States should also 
implement written guidelines which place a high premium on the 
consent of the arrestee, require police to request a third party to 
render assistance (if possible), and develop a "clothing spectrum" 
that is sensitive to the unique clothing and weather factors of each 
case. 
Although it is uncertain whether the Supreme Court would 
adopt the least intrusive alternative requirement if it were to hear a 
"clothing case," federal and state courts can and should zealously 
utilize this framework. In this manner, a judicious balance can be 
achieved in future "clothing cases" which provides reasonable 
faced because of the condition of his yard (See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying 
text), I believe that it is reasonable to always require that an arrestee wear shoes before 
departing from his residence. 
283. The subsequent ability to assess these judgments by an objective "reasona­
bleness" standard is another benefit which would accrue from establishing a clothing 
spectrum. 
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guidelines for the police while simultaneously respecting an arres­
tee's Fourth Amendment protections. 
Darrel C. Waugh 
